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Appendices.
------ -- AINU TOURIST RIGHTS
Tourism is a US$3.4 trillion a year global industry and, according to the 
World Tourism Organisation, the industry is expanding at 4 percent 
every year, the fastest growing industry in the world. In 1994, Africa 
as a whole accounted for only US$6.3 billion worth of tourist receipts, 
most of which was spent in North Africa. Southern Africa is currently 
attempting to gain a greater share of these tourist receipts and is 
trying to foster inter-regional tourism through such newly formed 
organisations as the Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa 
(RETOSA). A key aim of this organisation is to encourage inter-regional 
marketing packages to increase the volume of tourist receipts in the 
region. Such marketing networks are the first step towards creating 
packaged mass tourism.
"Nature Tourism"1 in Africa often involves the pursuit of "Wild Africa". 
The myth of “Wild Africa" is perpetuated as a marketing strategy to 
sell tourism to regional and international tourists. Yet in Kenya, in the 
last ten to twenty years, ever increasing tourism has found itself in 
competition with environmental conservation, agriculture, and other 
land and marine use strategies. Tourism is not simply the creation of a 
drama, it also gives tourists rights in the country they visit since they 
pay for a product. Such rights impact on the host countries social 
system. Tourists have a right to food, accommodation,: medical 
treatment, transport system and access to parks and natural resources 
which are part of their tourist product. In areas which are relatively 
unexposed to tourism, tourists are often involved in a process of 
propagation of value systems which clash or impact strongly on the 
cultures with which they come into contact. The frivolous Prayer for 
Tou r is t  post card (see page 2), sold in a staunchly Islamic part of the 
Kenya Coast, sums up this clash of values between the; sacred and the 
profane. In this context, the clash is most vividly symbolised through 
norms concerning appropriate dress: the skimpily dressed beach tourist 
and the local Islamic women dressed in full black veil or chador are 
often seen in the same context.
1 Throughout this paper terms such as: ecotourism, nature tourism, adventure tourism, 
sustainable tourism, and alternative tourism are used. There is considerable ambiguity and 
overlap in the way these terms are used by the tourist industry and I have not attempted to 
differentiate them. The terms are often used to evoke a sense of ecologically sound tourism. 
The point is that significant contradictions between rhetoric and tourism practice exist in 
the use of these terms.
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In Africa, tourists have a perceived right to experience the myth of 
wild Africa and to perpetuate it. For instance, tourists feel that they' 
have a right to see endangered species such as rhino, elephant, leopard 
and cheetah. Their rights are often supported by international lobby 
groups and are often more important than the rights of local people who 
may not afford to see these animals. Contiguous local people may not 
want to see wild animals because it will usually mean that their crops, 
property or lives are endangered.
P R A Y E R  F O R  T O U R IS T
Dear God, look down on us your humble tourists, who are doomed to travel 
this earth, taking photographs, sending postcards, shopping for souvenirs and 
walking around in drip-dry underwear.
Give us this day divine guidance, in the selection o f our hotels and lodges, that 
we may find our reservations honored, our rooms made up and hot water 
running from the taps.
We pray that the telephones work, and the operators answer and speak our 
language:
Lead us, dear Lord, to good, inexpensive restaurants where the food is superb, 
the waiters friendly and the wine included in the price.
Give us the wisdom to tip correctly in currencies we do not understand. Forgive 
us for undertipping out o f ignorance and overtipping out o f fear: Make the -• 
people love us for what we are, and not for what we cart contribute to their 
worldly goods. ' : v
Grant us the endurance to visit the lodges and game reserves listed as 
“musts" in the guidebooks.
A n d  if perchance we skip an important game fide to take a nap after lunch, 
have mercy on us, for our flesh is weak.
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Tourism is, therefore, a complex socio-cultural phenomenon. I t  involves 
the learned behaviours, attitudes and values associated with a leisure 
traypiier's experiences within a historically defined political and 
economic context. Western concepts of tourism are influenced by 
unequal historical, economic and political factors which influence 
values, behaviours and institutional arrangements associated with 
international travel, especially between rich areas and poor areas.
ECOTOURISM DEFINED BY WHAT IT DOES
Ecotourism can be defined as a marketing strategy or a segmentation 
within the complex socioeconomic forces that constitute tourism. 
Ecotourism is defined by the Ecotourism Society in terms of what they 
assert the market segment does: "ecotourism conserves the natural 
environment and well-being of local people through responsible travel" 
(Western 1994, 1 6).
Ecotourism, therefore, has two substantive elements which differen­
tiate it from standard tourism. It claims to:
* conserve the natural environment; and
*  benefits the local people.
Ecotourism usually claims to achieve these two ideals by providing 
economic incentives. This paper analyses the practical results of 
attempts at ecotourism in three African countries over the last ten to 
fifty years.
ECOTOURISM IS TOURISM
Ecotourism is''tourism.• .'/A'.central’ '.'problem, with tourism is jjia t its 
historical evolution in the 20th Century involves the phase of mass 
tourism (see Figure T). Mass tourism occurs wherever the negative 
impacts of tourism are a result of the large numbers of tourist 
arrivals. Mass tourism is usually characterised by the environmental 
and social costs of tourism being greater than the alleged benefits. 
Mass tourism, therefore, involves a net environmental and social loss
from tourism2. The danger of mass tourism is that it may destroy the 
environmental and social foundation for ecotourism, as well as 
compromising other sustainable uses of agriculture, fishing, hunting, 
and natural resource management. This is the evolutionary Catch 
Twenty Two: of successful ecotourism (see Figure 1). Success breeds 
failure and ecotourism becomes mass tourism.
Ecotourism springs from an ahistorical, synchronic and functional 
analysis of tourism, couched in terms of its present social and 
environmental impacts rather than its historical development as part 
of the political economy. Thus ecotourism attempts both teleologically 
and tautologically to treat the negative symptoms of tourism, and 
portrays itself as ' being both environmentally sustainable and 
culturally and socially appropriate. The evolution of this marketing! 
segment diachronically (i.e., what ecotourism evolves into over tim e) is 
seldom discussed except in non-historical micro-level sustainability 
terms. That is, people are asking, "Will all the litter be picked up in 
the camp-site when the picnic is oyer?" When they should be asking, 
"What are the implications of the camp-site being turned into a casino- 
hotel conglomerate?". - >
Ecotourism, soft-tourism, comfnunity-based tourism, nature tourism, 
conservation tourism, culture tourism, alternative travel ... whatever 
the marketing segment or label might be, whatever rhetorical gloss is 
used, essentially ecotourism is TOURISM. This paper argues that 
ecotourism in Africa is ; often the exploratory: phase of mass tourism. 
This is an essential first point in the analysis. .
The second essential point is th at the historical development of 
ecotourism in Africa has been observed and analysed for at least the  
last thirty years. Therefore, baseline data and analyses are available. 
There is, arguably, nothing new about ecotourism except that people 
say that the time is now ripe for it to be instituted. Few people realise 
that it has already been tried and tested in Africa and elsewhere.
f'S
2 it is often very difficult to place an economic value on environmental and social costs. 
Usually these are underestimated.
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THE COSTA RICAN EXPERIENCE
David Western has argued that the term ecotourism emerged out of 
concern to save the South American rain forests. The argument was 
that, if enough nature loving tourists turned up to appreciate the 
forests, this would conserve them from logging, ranching, and 
settlement (Western 1994, 15). Mass tourism can, in this sense, 
provide an economic incentive for governments, the tourism industry 
and local communities to conserve their natural resources instead of 
depleting them for short term gains. That is, mass tourism can be 
ecotourism if it protects the environment and benefits local people. 
This argument is an example of the synchronic and functional view of 
tourism. The historical development of tourism in Costa Rica belies 
this. Ironically, the turn-out of these benign nature and people loving 
tourists in Costa Rica has been so great that it is now "... hastening the 
destruction of the very thing people came to worship" (Baker 1994, 52- 
53). Because Costa Rica lacks a tourism development plan to control 
growth, developers are pushing up hotels in sensitive areas such as the 
coastal strip and wet lends. Yet Costa Rica was the primary ecotourist 
destination in the Americas, and more research and thought has been 
put into ecotourism in Costa Rica than in any other country in the world 
(Ashton 1992).
HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS OF ECOTOURISM IN KENYA
Of the three countries Considered, Kenya has the longest history of 
negotiation between local government, local communities, central 
government, and investment funding from private or governmental 
sources in regard to ecotourism, Kenya's experiments with ecotourism 
predate those experiments currently taking place in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. Recent trends in Kenya's tourism industry teach us 
important lessons for the Southern African tourism industry.
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, wildlife and coastal tourism 
became Kenya's number one currency earner. In 1980, tourism earned 
US$418 million, and in 1992, US $415 million dollars; and yet, in 1993, 
tourism earned Only US $313 million, losing it's status as number one 
currency earner to tea (Shaw 1994, 4). International visitor numbers 
increased from 35,000 in 1955 (Western 1994, 17) to 826,000 in 1993 
(Shaw 1994, 4). Between 1980 and 1989, the number of international 
tourist arrivals doubled from 36 2 ,0 00  to 7 1 3 ,8 0 0  (World Tourism
° .5:
rgamsation Statistics 1 9 8 7 /8 8 ). In Kenyan Shilling terms, earrings 
increased by a multiple of five over that decade (82.5 million in 1980  
to 432 million in 1989). In US dollar terms Kenya allegedly earned 
more in 1980 than it did in, either 1991, 1992 or 1993 (Shaw 1994, 4). 
Thus despite the phenomenal increase in tourist arrivals the hard 
currency earnings from tourism as a whole have fallen (Shaw 1994, 4), 
apd the foreign currency earnings per tourist have dwindled to less 
than half over the decade.- Despite this trend in the decrease in hard 
currency earnings per tourist, more tourists are projected and 950,000  
werp hoped for in 1994. The stark reality is that more and more 
tourists are bringing less and less money. This is possible through 
leakage of revenue (see discussion below) such as occurs with package 
tours organised from country of origin using foreign Owned carriers, 
hotel and car rental companies.
The environmental Sind social costs of mass tourism in Kenya include:
*  squatter/informal settlements;
*  increased crime and prostitution-directly related to
' tourism; - : '
*  inadequate sewerage disposal;
* increased inflation in the price of local commodities;
* over utilization of parks;
*  decrease in the quality of the tourism experience; and
* many other factors.
Yet, Kenyans want the industi^ to continue expanding and believe that 
they can counter the negative impacts by opening up more and more 
areas to ecotourism, thereby shedding the load off the current popular 
destinations. It is indeed ironic that a large proportion o f this mass 
tourism is now occurring in sites, which were originally planned as 
environmentally friendly, community based ecotourism sites. 
Ironically, the research into ecotourism in these sites in the 1970 ’s 
, has inspired and informed many Of the community based management 
experiments occurring in other African countries.
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MAASAI MARA AND AMBOSELI
„ - . ■ \  . ■ . . .
In Kenya, the Maasai Mara and Amboseli Council Game Reserves were 
specifically established to involve local communities in conservation. 
.Conceived and established 30 years ago and initially negotiated 45 
years ago, they provide important lessons in ecotourism3. In the 
1950 s, documented negotiation regarding the reduction of livestock 
numbers in the Amboseli basin took place between the Kenya National 
Parks and local Maasai elders who were living in the Amboseli National 
Reserve and it was agreed that a proportion of the entry fees were to 
be paid to the Maasai. At that time the only way funds could be 
channelled was through the district council at Kajiado and "none of this 
money found its way into the hands of the people around the Reserve for 
whom it was intended" (Kenya Wildlife Service 1990, Annex 6, 165). In 
1968, a development plan for a multiple use conservation area was 
established for Amboseli which was adopted within the traditional 
political and cultural framework associated with the Maasai, in 
conjunction with the existing administrative structures of the Kenyan 
state (Western and Thresher, 1973).
David Western, a researcher, and Sindiyo, the warden of the County 
Council Reserve at the time, set up a wildlife committee which 
continued to exist for the next twenty years to be used or ignored by 
subsequent wardens. This plan worked towards the integration of 
livestock and wildlife economies to reduce conflict between these land 
use strategies. Revenues were to accrue from tourist development, 
such as the establishment of tourist lodges, which would involve the 
payment of wildlife utilization fees to Maasai group ranch holders next 
to Amboseli. These ranches were to accommodate migratory wildlife 
herds, be involved in leasing out hunting and tourist concessions, 
develop water resources for their cattle, herds, and establish a 
communal centre. The Maasai who traditionally coexisted with cattle 
and livestock had historically resisted the establishment of the 
reserves as they felt it was an attempt to appropriate their land.
3 As early as the 1950s, the director of the national parks and the Amboseli warden 
proposed that the Amboseli Maasai should get a portion of the. revenue generated by the 
reserve. :Since 1961, Amboseli game reserve has: generated income for the Kajiado District 
Council. When Amboseli became a national park, the council retained a small piece of land, a 
safari lodge and continued to earn a percentage of gate fees.
In 1974, the local Maasai in the Amboseli area became joint owners of 
the surrounding rangelands as a number of group ranches were 
established. Simultaneously, Amboseli was gazetted a National Park 
and negotiatidnS Continued with the Maasai about suitable  
compensations and benefits from the National Park. Group Ranch 
committees were formed to manage the affairs of the group ranches. 
Wildlife and tourism issues fell under their jurisdiction. However, 
these committees had little cohesion. In 1977, further discussion led 
to the 1977 park agreement, through which adequate water was to be 
provided for Maasai livestock outside the park; and there was to be 
compensation for the toleration of wildlife grazing on group ranch 
lands. It was planned that the costs were to be eventually phased out 
when they were off-set by the predicted revenue group ranches would 
earn from tourism activities. Infrastructural services such as a school 
and a dispensary were to be provided. These plans were subjected to 
extensive negotiation between the county council, group ranch 
representatives, and the central government under the auspices of the 
World Bank which-was providing funds for a project to improve the 
infrastructure of Amboseli, provided local people received a share of 
revenue generated (Kenya Wildlife Services 1990, Annex 6).
In the late 19 7 0 ’s, the plan met with a number of obstacles which 
included the Kenyan government’s ban on hunting, depriving ranches of 
significant revenue4, and the flagging tourist market. A significant and 
recurring problem (one that is not confined to Kenya) was that resource 
benefits were being co-opted and mismanaged at national and district 
levels by the councils, departments and ministries involved in wildlife 
management (Hamilton 1992). Inequity of revenue sharing and the co­
opting of local resources by local, district, national and international 
elites is, therefore, the crucial problem in ecotourism management.
4 "Prior to the ban on hunting in 1977, a lucrative source of income from wildlife was 
hunting. Between 1958 and 1974 the Kajiado District outside of the Parks was divided into 
controlled area hunting and photographic blocks. License fees went to the central 
government, and controlled area fees charges for each animal shot went to the county 
council. With the establishment of the former hunting blocks into private and group 
ranches the district was redivided into "wildlife management units". The wildlife 
management department helped negotiate hunting concessions on group ranches. Hunting and 
tourist companies leased blocks directly from the Maasai earning considerable revenue. 
However, there were often delays and improper distribution of fees to group ranches. The 
government ban on sport hunting in 1977 stopped this source of income.
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LEAKAGE ■ ,
pt;her writers have referred to this same; problem in the tourist 
industry, as a whole, as "leakage1'. Leakage, in this sense, refers to the 
amount of tourist revenue th a t does not stay in the host country, or 
destination, and results from paying for imported skills, technologies 
and commodities to support tourism. For example, repatriation o f  
profits from international hotels, car rental companies, oil imports, 
marketing abroad, etc. I also use it to refer to the amount raked off by 
the various levels, institutions and individuals, involved in ecotourist
negotiations and which, therefore, does not reach the local level. A 
good example, in the Kenyan context, is the leakage that takes place 
when revenues designed for local people go through county councils.
The Kenyan examples employ the assumptions about participation and 
devolution of benefits to local communities through both culturally 
based and state institutions. The Kenyan ecotourism outcomes
underline the need to clarify local communities legal rights o f access 
to these benefits in such a multi-jurisdictional tourism process. For 
example, in 1989 David Western estimated that the Amboseli National 
Park generated about Ksh30G million (Kenyan shillings) mainly from 
accommodation, tariffs, game drives, camping, road and air transport, 
and park entrance fees (Kenya Wildlife Service 1990, Annex 6, 133). Of 
this figure less than 3 percent stayed in Kajiado District. Of the 6
million shillings remaining in Kajiado district 50 percent remained 
with the Kajiado county council in the form of royalties from the park, 
leaving very little left for "local benefit".
Olgulului Group Ranch surrounds the Amboseli Park and traditionally it 
was the people of Olgulului who agreed to hand over 150 square 
kilometres to the new park and move out of the area. They therefore 
feel that they should receive the highest compensation. But the park 
agreement under which grazing compensation was to be given, was 
discontinued in 1983 and the agreement to provide water for their 
herds outside the park was not met. Local level plans and agreements 
are therefore subject, to much wider economic and political forces. 
Institutional and governmental differentiation of functions means that 
different ministries and departments have jurisdiction over different 
aspects o f local life. Furthermore, competing jurisdictions exist at 
district* provincial, national and international levels. Tourism is 
! particularly subject to these different; functions; because it is a
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reflection of political and economic processes at intefnatiohal, 
national and district levels. The political economy- of tpurism m Kenya 
is not based and can not be based, at the local level, because travellers 
come from elsewhere, and one of their biggest expenses is their 
international flight. Ecotpurisrh ignores this reality at the expense of 
becoming a purely facile notion. The systematic marginalization of the 
local level, in favour of other vested interests at higher levels, such as 
the economic issues that determine the networks of aircraft travel, is 
areality that can not be avoided.'
NiAASAI MARA
The Maasai Mara reserve was placed under the direct control of the 
Narok County Council in 1961, the rationale being that the long term' 
sustainability of local resources is tied up with the benefits to local 
people. The reserve is a small corner of the vast Serengeti ecosystem 
of Tanzania which, stretches into; Kenya. It is part of one of the most 
productive natural terrestrial ecosystems. The Maasai Mara is one of 
the most visited reserves in East Africa and the group ranches which 
lie next to it are a vital part of the dispersal area Tor such tourist 
attractions as the annual migrations of approximately 2 million 
wildebeest, zebra and Thomsons’ gazelle between their wet season 
range in the north and the dry season range in the south. A third of all 
safari's within Kenya visit the Maasai Mara (Western 1991). Between 
1980 and 1990 the annual numbers of visitors to the reserve almost
doubled from 84,094 in 1980 to 161,434 in 1990. Over that period the 
number of bed nights more than doubled from 113,549 in 1980 to  
254,574 in 1990 (Koikai 1991, ). Keekorok Lodge was the first lodge to 
be .built (1965) and between 1972 and 1991, 16 more lodges were built 
with a capacity o f 1,492 visitors at any one time. 890 of these 
potential bed nights are located Outside the reserve on the Maasai group 
ranches.
In evaluating the;ijnpact of this rapid increase in use of the park and 
surrounding areas the most obvious question to ask is who benefits and 
who pays the environmental and social costs? The general trend is that 
the main beneficiaries were the private tourist industry, to a lesser 
extent the Narok District Council, and to a much lesser extent the group 
ranches. The profits that accrue from tourism are largely in the hands 
of outside operators. For example^ NortonTGriffiths indicates that in 
1989 US 20 million in revenue Was generated by the Maasai Mara
National Reserve and US$ TO million on the group ranches. He states 
that for the main part these revenues are created by and channelled 
through operators of package tours, tented safaris, balloon safaris, 
lodges and airlines* He states that the revenues that do go directly to 
landowners are through employment, bed night and visitor fees and 
lease fees. In 1989, the landowners received only 1 .6 percent of the 
tourist revenues generated on their land (Norton-Griffiths 1994).
Douglas-Hamilton and Associates estimated that in 1987 tourism 
operations on the National Reserve and the surrounding group ranches 
generated an estimated Ksh444 million of which 26 million were 
retained in. Maasai Mara area and Narok district. Of this figure Narok; 
couijty council earned Ksh23 million and the group ranches earned 
Ksh2.8 millidh. In other words, less than one percent went to local 
group ranches (Hamilton 1988).
Since 1989 the Narok County Council has been collecting Ksh50 
(currently about US $1 ) from every , visitor to  the reserve and 
distributing the amount to the adjacent group ranches in an attempt to 
get direct benefits back from tourism. Organisations such as the Ol 
Choro Oirua Wildlife Management and Conservation Association and 
other similar ^spcjations^ ir4 other parts; qf Kenya 
the problems identified above are being addressed. This small group of 
eight landowners lying next to the Maasai Mara National Park are 
attempting to plough back the revenues that are earned through tourism 
into direct benefits for local people. Lodges on these group ranches pay 
a ten year concession lease and a percentage of the bed night fee plus a 
game viewing fee to the association.
 ^ Thirty percent of this revenue is divided among the 
private group ranch holders.
Nineteen percent of this revenue is divided among 
the group ranch neighbours in an attempt to provide 
them with an economic incentive to continue having 
wildlife on their land.
Ten percent is for long term community projects in
the area including schools, hospitals and bursaries.
Six percent is for the rhino programme that exists on
? . t the ranches.
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Five percent is for vehicle contingency fund and 
thirty percent is for administration of the association 
(personal communication with Orr, December 1994).
Mechanisms such as these have met with growing political opposition 
form Narok County Council, who historically earned revenue from both 
the Maasai Mara and the surrounding ranches during the era when these 
were all held under communal tenure.
Attempts to secure the area for wildlife conservation have also come 
under attack from politicians lobbying for lucrative wheat growing in 
the area. A key problem in the long term evaluation of such 
conservation initiatives is the environmental and social costs of an 
ecotourism which has to  keep expanding in order to pay the numerous 
allocations of revenue. The tourism experience, the physical 
environment, and the impact of the social costs of tourism all bear the 
brunt in the process.
The same problem faces the Kenya Wildlife Service Community 
Conservation Programme whose central theme on private land is the 
shifting of rights,-responsibilities and revenue to the land owners who 
conserve wildlife. The key elernent of this is revenue sharing in 
exchange for contractual obligations of the land holders vis-a-vis 
wildlife management. It therefore is not conceived in terms of a hand­
out, but as meeting the opportunity costs of having wildlife on private 
land. The Kenya Wildlife 1991-95 plan claims that twenty-five percent 
of all gate fees earned will be distributed through appropriate local 
channels such as group ranch committees. County councils were 
rejected as a conduit for this revenue sharing because even perfectly 
representative county councils represent the interests of a much wider 
constituency than simply the park- dispersal areas.5 Ironically, 
therefore, the debate and negotiation is substantively exactly the same 
in the 1990s as the debate that took place between Maasai elders and 
park wardens in th e  1950's. This brings us to the key technical 
questions raised by the Kenyan material: How do you get benefits 
back to local people when you are dealing w ith m ultip le
5 This is ah incisive conclusion from fifty years of discussion, negotiation and experiment in 
the Kenyan context. It is pertinent in that the same problem of devolving benefits plagues 
many areas where the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFiRE) is practised in Zimbabwe. <:
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levels, o f  revenue extraction and leakage?6 Because of the large 
number of components in the tourism industry (natural and cultural 
resources and events, infrastructure, tourism plant, wholesalers, 
retailers and consumers; (see Figure 2) ecotourism is particularly 
prone to leakage.
A significant current thrust is that of "empowering communities" and 
the Kenya Wildlife Service have drawn on the expertise of NGO's 
involved in the Freirian methods associated with making people aware 
of their options and proposing their own solutions (Berger 1993), The 
problem with this approach to ecotourism is that people can talk about 
their problems, such as leakage (see page 8); and propose solutions but 
if systematic marginalization of r loeai initiatives is enforced by legal 
and institutional, frameworks it  is extremely difficult for local people 
to implement thojr own solutions without a great deal of co-operation 
from higher levels. In linguistic terms this dilemma is like the 
difference between an etic or emic explanation. People immersed in a 
certain culture, belief system or way of doing things will be able to 
explain their thinking and actions in terms of the framework they 
belong to. There is anpther order of explanation which may provide 
important insights into the culture or way of doing things. This is the 
framework of the outside observer who analyses these internal 
meanings comparatively. Some of the main problems in implementing 
ecotourism are structural ones that relate to the political culture and 
economic hierarchies that are involved in tourism and the long term  
historical cycles associated with tourism. The components of the 
tourism process (see Figure 2) are such that local people by themselves 
are not equipped to plan tourist endeavour. In order for community 
^involvement in ecotourism to take place successful negotiation has to  
take place between the private tourist industry, the government 
authorities involved in tourism and the local community. Each of these 
is internally differentiated and responds to  dynamics. For example, 
operators in the private tOurist industry compete with each other to  
capture a piece o f an ever changing, dynamic tourist market. Local 
communities are not homogeneous and frequently are highly divided in 
regard to decisions about local resource use. Wildlife departments or 
agencies, local governm ent and governm ent authorities with  
jurisdiction over mineral and natural resources may have very a fferent 
agendas which impinge on local plans to conduct ecotourism (e.g., what
6 The,context within which the debate has taken place has changed dramatically, but the 
debate itself has stayed the same. Ecotourism simply puts a gloss on a debate that has been 
bouncing back and forth for the last fifty years in the Kenyan context.
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happens ^o.:local ecotourism plans when government decides to drill for 
oil, build a dam, mine for gold or designate the area for wheat 
farming?).
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND CRAFTS EXPLOITATION
One of the most frequently cited benefits of tourism is employment. In 
the Maasai Mara context Killian was abie to obtain data on the extent to 
which Maasai were involved in the tourism industry and identified the 
kind of jobs available or occupied by local Maasai in the 15 lodges 
existing at the time of his study (Killian 1 9 9 1). Despite clauses in 
lodge employment procedures to the effect that local Maasai should get 
preferential employment, he identified that out of a total of 1,065  
workers, 370 claimed to be Maasai. He states that a number of workers 
purported to be Maasai when in fact they were not. Furthermore, he 
identified that most Of these . 370 Maasai undertook the menial jobs 
(paid the lowest salaries) as opposed to the managerial and skilled 
jobs. His data also indicates that most of the jobs provided were not 
allocated to people who lived near to the lodges.
Tourism seems to be a famine or a feast when it comes to employment 
opportunities and profit margins. A large craft business exists on the 
road to and from Narok to the Maasai Mara, where one can be charged 
twenty times the going rate for craft, items. For example, a kikoi  
(cloth warn by men) which sells for Ksh180 (US$4.50) in Mombasa, was 
here offered at a starting price o f Ksh40Q0 (US$100). Killian (personal 
communication, December 1994) reports that these businesses are 
frequently not owned by local Maasai, but by business men from Nairobi. 
A trip to the Maasai Mara inevitably entails a paid visit to a Maasai 
traditional village. Again the danger is that this kind o f interaction 
becomes mutually exploitative. Maasai culture is commoditized for 
tourism, and genuine tourist interest in culture can easily be exploited 
and manipulated for economic gains. A drama or charade has to be 
presented for the tourist, and inevitably there is a degree of 
artificiality and artifact in the interaction (see Smith 1989).
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ECOTOURISM COMPETES WITH OTHER LAND USE STRATEGIES
-;Y '  :rU  ' -.t’ -;
Against this backdrop of the lack of local benefit, or inappropriate 
transactions resulting from tourism, it must be understood that the
single greatest threat to the Maasai Mara ecosystem is the rapid 
expansion of'crop agricurture mainly wheat farming on the Loita Plains 
(Goodman 1993). The expansion of wheat farming is interesting for 
those; observers from Southern Africa who have argued that a 
priyatisatioh-o f communal land tends to provide incentive for 
landowners; to conserve their natural resources. In the case of the 
Maasai Mara, privatisation has lead to subdivision and sale of 
traditional Maasai land ; for wheat farming. Privatisation', has in this 
sense, contributed to ; the insecurity of the historical human/wildlife 
interactions on these plains and it may also ultimately lead to the loss 
of Maasai land. Norton- Griffiths argues that the reason is that there 
are large discrepancies between the revenues Maasai landowners earn 
from livestock management, tourism and agriculture in comparison to 
using the same land to its full agricultural potential. The revenue 
differential is as much, as 1:22 on land with gdod agricultural potential. 
He proposes a system by which the landowners are paid the opportunity 
costs to set aside their land for wildlife and claims that these funds 
could be derived from tourism and other sources7. However, he points 
out that the present community based wildlife conservation and 
utilization programs in the Serengeti ecosystem will not generate the 
scale of revenues needed to prevent agricultural development, and 
therefore indicates that the group ranches will abandon conservation by 
default under the prevailing revenues derived wildlife tourism 
(Norton-Griffiths 1993).
IS ECOTOURISM UNDERMINING THE MAASAI MARA?
Goodman points out the irony that while the Maasai Mara is in grave 
danger of being overrun•: by wHeat /farming, th e  indiscriminate and 
uncontrolled ecotourism taking place in the heart of the ecosystem is 
placing it in jeopardy. Of particular note is the ad hoc development of 
lodges and camps, with little respect for environmental impact. The 
most evident of these impacts is from the tour vehicles which drive 
across the planes in any direction, and are not restricted to tracks. The 
radio contact that exists between drivers attempting to show their 
clients the best snap shots of the "big five" (i.e., elephant, rhino, lion, 
buffalo, and leopard), and- thereby get a good tip at the end of the 
safari, is focal for understanding this negative impact. It is not 
unusual for a single lion or cheetah in the Mara to be surrounded by
7 This is somewhat like the "We’ll buy the Amazon" solution to conservation problems 
allegedly proposed by American environmental economists.
thirty vehicles each with an average .pf six tourists appreciating nature 
(s^e phbtograph on front cover of this paper)> From theVair the Mara is 
essentially a spider web of vehicle tracks which are steadily eroding 
the landscape- Is this ecotourism? The answer , is that This, js what 
ecotourism plans can end up as being. As market-trends force- Kenya to 
open up new areas to new uses, it is wise to evaluate ecotourism in 
terms of the lessons provided by the historical development of 
ecotourism in Kenya to date. These lessons are as follows: ; ;
* There is a tendency for successful ecotourism to become 
mass tourism (see Rgure 1 ).i This ban orily be eontroilod by 
the establishment of regulations concerning ad /ioe tourist 
development. ■TiiW
Leakage of tourism revenue must riot be underestimated. 
Elaborate mechanisms concerning contractual agreements 
specifying benefits of tourism at the local level rieed to be 
v established. For more on this see technical section on
Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE progfariime;b b ~ ^
T The pervading political , culture and management sy;stems 
largely determ ine whether local level institu tions  
(councils, group ranches, committees, etc.) can be effective. 
The technical aspects of ecotourism alone cannot ensure 
success. c ' ':
It is also obvious that these lessons have direct bearing oh plbns ufdr 
ecotourism experiments in Zimbabwe and South Africa ’which will also 
succumb to market pressure to open up new areas, :
THE TOURISM7. M l F-QES^ V .:-;r 7^ ': !
T ) f A remote and exotic spot offers peaceful rest and relaxation-and 
T 0  : provides an- escape for the rich oP adventurous^ i who live: in
isolation from the resident population. b;u;
2) Tourism promotion attracts persons of middle iricoriie, who come 
as much for the rest and relaxation as to im itate the rich ;or 
7 adventurous. More and morehotelaccommodatipm^
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facilities are built to attract and accommodate more and more 
tourists; : :r ■ /■■'/ ' T, / “
3) This transforms the original character of the place from an  ^
, "escape paradise" to a series of conurbations, with several 
consequences: v : ;  ; Iv  '-J-ir-- '-V.-
* Some local residents become tourism employees and earn:
more than ever before; awhile: others lose access to 
resources which formerly sustained them, but now are co­
opted by the tourist market. >
* o -pjlhe^  rich tourists move on elsewhere, because the quality pf
thpir experience has been compromised by the tourist 
,„r;, development. 7 V 7  V  ■ T
■\L * The growth in the tourist population makes interaction 
between tourist and resident population inevitable leading 
to a variety of Social consequences. ^
' Increased tourist accommodation capacity leads to an 
/ '  excess of supply over demand, and a deterioration in product 
and price. The country resorts to mass tourjsm, attracting 
; ■ people of lower standards of social behaviour and economic
u ; .p o w e r. This leads to the social and environmental
degradation of the tourist destination. /  ; ^
v T As the place sinks under the weight: of social friction and 
., * solid waste, tourists exit, leaving behind derelict tourism 
facilities, littered beaches and country side, and a resident 
; , population that cannot return to its ; former; way of life: 
n ; (modified by the author from Sobers, undated)
'As^vJe have s e e h ^ K e n y a is a t  «r c fo s s -rb a d s jit the " historical 
d^^tdpfhdnt 'b^-tddfiSrff;^andasthemass tburistexperience/is eroded 
ihliyactS^b^ steadily increasing urban^ and rural poverty and 
squaidi;:! pdlitiddl  ^ instability^’ solid wkste;^andienvirdrirnehtal
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degradation, several Kenyan scholars and observers have expressed the 
idea that tourists will soon, abandon Kenya in favour of other 
destinations where, these negative impacts are. not as critical. 
Predictions of massive increases in tourist arrivals have been 
predicted for both Zimbabwe and South Africa (EXA InternatjOnal/CHL 
Consulting Group 1993). The key questions are how to plan a strategy 
to cope with masses of tourists, particularly in regard to; the opening 
up of areas hitherto unutilised by tourists, and where does ecotourism 
fit into this picture?
CONSUMPTIVE OR NON-CONSUMPTIVE ECOTOURISM IN ZIMBABWE
Tourism is Zimbabwe's fastest growing industry and is the country's 
third largest foreign currency earner. In 1994, visitor arrivals for the 
first time passed the million mark (1 ,039  0 3 1 ). According to the 
Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation, the annual increase was a 
15 percent upsurge from the 1993 figure, it is estimated that by the 
year two thousand 1,5 million visitors a year will arrive in Zimbabwe. 
Jones indicates that tourist arrivals in Zimbabwe have increased at an 
average rate of 8.4 percent per annum since the end of the civil war in 
1980 (Jones and Hasler 1994). The Zimbabwe Tourist Development 
Corporation tourist statistics indicate an increase in tourist arrivals 
from 268,418 in 1980 to 703,279 in 1992. According to Jones, the 
average number of nights spent in Zimbabwe per tourist has declined 
from 10.9 nights in 1980 to 5.3 nights in 1993 (Jones and Hasler 1994, 
26). Jones also stated that the regional markets provide over 86 
percent of the total number of visitors to Zimbabwe/ 49,6 percent of 
total arrivals are from South Africa. The percentage of arrivals from 
North America, Europe and other international arrivals is therefore a 
relatively small percentage of the total number but this sector is 
likely to grow at a steady rate of up to 9 percent per annum until such 
time as these international tourists choose an alternative destination 
(Financial Gazette 1995). European Economic Community consultants to 
the Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation emphasised that this 
sector of the market, particularly those looking for an up market 
ecotourist destination, should be encouraged in the future through an 
active marketing strategy targeting these groups as these visitors 
tended to spend more (personal communication with EXA consultant). 
South African tourists tend to bring their own food, their own caravan 
accommodation and therefore spend relatively little ori their visits.
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Zimbabwe does in fact favour a policy of high paying low volume 
tourists, and Zimbabwe's safari camp: and lodge facilities often  
specifically . market international visitors on an ecptourism basis; It is 
important: ,to  recognise , that; countries which want to  expand their 
tourism receipts, such as Zimbabwe and South; Africa can use the  
Cpncept of ecotourism .to. justify growth in the industry from both a 
moral and an environmental standpoint regardless of whether the 
tourism practice that they self is environmentally sound and socially 
beneficial. There are no regulations defining or governing ecotourism 
and therefore the term is essentially ambiguous and Contestable. 
Tourists also feel the pressure to be more politically and ecologically 
correct visitors to foreign countries. They are therefore inclined to 
label themselves ecotouristS, despite leaving their home countries on 
large resource consuming fossil fuelled aircraft8. .
One of Zimbabwe's premier destinations for wildlife and nature tourism 
is the Hwange National Park. Economic trends occurring around this 
park inform us of the likely outcomes and developments in other 
wildlife tourism destinations on the borders of other parks particularly 
in regard to the new experiments with ecotourism under the CAMPFIRE 
program9. Jones summary of tourist facility types and numbers of beds 
in the Gwayi commercial farming region bordering Hwange National 
Park indicates that twenty-two safari C£rnps and lodges have been 
buijt since 1980 with a total of 368 beds. Eighteen of these were built 
since 1990 and two more are likely to be constructed in the near future 
(See Table 3). jU'
Jones concludes that the proliferation of photographic safari camps and 
lodges that have sprung up in the last five years in this, area has led to 
the safari camp sector of the market being over-traded leading to some 
operators being pushed out of the market. He also argues that "the 
competition has forced operators to reduce charges or increase 
commissions to maintain occupancy levels at a lower profit" (Jones and
8 One safari operator in the Victoria Falls area has identified this need among tourists and 
offers tourists at an affluent hotel an opportunity to "meet the people". Tourist are taken 
to a local school where they observe school children, exchange addresses and may inspect 
infrastructural improvements such as boreholes and school blocks. When the tourists 
return to their home countries they may send items: or* money 5as a gift to individuals or to 
the school as a whole. . . . ' K  • r^:1
■ 9 Examples in the area include the Mahenye Lodge on the border of Gonarezhou National 
Park, the  lodge at Mucheni Gorge on the border of Chizarira National Park and the lodge 
under construction on the Gorges below Victoria Falls near to the Victoria Falls Park.
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Hasler 1994, 26). Jones supports his argument with data on the growth 
rate of bed availability in the Gwayi/Hwange area, which is three times 
higher than- the increase in the number of visitor arrivals in Zimbabwe. 
However, hie mentions that as safari camp lodges are mainly geared 
towards the high paying international tourists their business is most 
affected by the shortage of aircraft capacity servicing the Hwange park 
airport, but indicates that this capacity is likely to be increased in the 
near future. A significance of Jones's case study is that it indicates 
that a process towards mass tourism in this sector is currently 
building momentum, especially in the Hwange/Victoria Falls area. A 
study currently being undertaken on the Victoria Falls area has been 
partly instigated because of this concern about mass tourism.
A tendency towards developing mass sales through regional and 
international marketing networks (see opening paragraph of this pkpef) 
is likely to usher in a new era of mass tourism for Zimbabwe. This is a 
critical evaluative, criteria for assessing the long term potential for 
and impacts of community based-tourism in communal areas next to  
national parks and protected areas in other;parts of Zimbabwe. It  is 
important to know if the process o f  expansion will^in-th© long term  
replicate itself on communal land next to national parks. In this regard 
current legislation is in place to  restrict fhe nature;and type of 
tourism that takes place on communal land and environmental impact 
procedures, bureaucratic inertia, exclusive contracts for photographic 
iCpncessions, d ifferentiation  o f in terests and lack o f willing 
investment partners all m ilitate ' against mass tourism in these  
communal areas at this point in time. However, the predicted increases 
in tourist arrivals indicate that this situation could rapidly change in 
those areas where mass tourism is already starting to take place. 
CAMPFIRE experiments with noh^cohsumptive -tourism have three  
general outcomes depending on the tourist resources that they mairket, 
the degree to which the market will expand, and the controls that are 
implemented in planing this kind Of tourism: ;* • 50 rv -
1) They represent the exploratory phase of mass tourism and will 
k  ultimately have a negative effect on these communities unless 
strict measures conrinue to control tourism.
y 2) ; Because of leakage and added demand for revenue sharing many 
community based experiments will not be able to compete
economically with other destinations where mass tourism is
^- V  ; ; i o
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taking place and will collapse because of lack of profit.
3) Extremely tight control of tourism development on communal land 
Will allow for models of high paying low-volume tourism. Similar 
to the Kenyan case, the Zimbabwean context determines that this 
last option is not merely a matter of implementing the technical 
aspects of ecotourism. It is also inherently dependent on broader 
political and economic factors.
A PRECISE EXAMPLE OF ECOTOURISM:
CAMPFIRE and the Conundrum o f the Green Elephant Kill 
The Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) programme generates revenue for local people for the 
building of schools, clinics, grinding mills and household dividends10 
mainly via hunting concession lease agreements through district 
councils. This consumptive use of resources takes places on a 
sustainable yield basis on marginal agricultural land held under
communal tenure. This is the most precise example of ecotourism that 
exists in the three countries considered because safari hunting under 
CAMPFIRE almost completely fulfils the definition of ecotourism as 
environmentally low impact and socially beneficial tourism. Direct 
economic benefits are received Under CAMPFIRE11, and the  
environmental and social costs of the programme are manageable. A 
process of building institutional capacity at the lowest levels is in 
place and this involves the creation of accountability over revenues. 
The negative impacts of non-conSumptive tourism identified in the 
Kenya case studies can be managed and confined and the tendency 
towards mass tourism does not apply to hunting because of 
comparative numbers.
10 Several household dividends have been distributed to villages and wards where animals
have been shot (These usually range from Z$20 to Z$400 per household depending on the 
gross revenue accumulated.) Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management 
Guidelines for the distribution of wildlife revenue earned under CAMPFIRE stipulates that 
the district council should retain no more than 15% of gross revenue as a levy. Up to 35 
percent may be allocated for district wildlife management. At least 50 percent of the 
revenue should be returned to the wards, villages and householdis where the animals were 
shot. ■. ’■ ' 1
11 Villages and wards receive revenues from trophy fees and concession lease agreements 
paid to district councils by safari operators. Some councils are more effective in devolving 
this revenue to wards than others, and the CAMPFIRE programme has been criticised for 
recentralizing control of wildlife at the district level.
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An important source of revenue in the programme is the hunting of 
trophy elephants, which is staunchly opposed by the northern based 
green movement12. Safari hunting usually involves the setting up of a 
simple but tasteful tented or semi-permanent hunting camp, with pit 
latrine, the clearing of a landing field in a usually remote and 
relatively inaccessible concession area. Hunting usually entails one or 
two high paying client hunters being driven through the hunting 
concession area, until such time as they disembark to track or hide for 
their prey. A hunt may include a range of different species hunted over 
a period from a few days to three weeks (a typical twenty-one day hunt 
may include plains game such as kudu, wildebeest, as well as a buffalo, 
an elephant, a lion, etc). Hunting takes place on a sustainable quota 
system and therefore the client may have to visit different hunting 
concessions in order to obtain the hunting bag. A team of skinners and 
trackers is also associated with a hunt. Under CAMPFIRE these trackers 
are usually local people and the hunting team may also include a trainee 
hunter and guides from the local area. Zimbabwean ecologists and 
safari operators alike have long argued that safari hunting is far more
ecologically friendly and economically viable than intensive  
photographic or nature tourism, because it involves a series of single 
high paying clients, the construction of a simple bush camp, and two or 
three four wheel drive vehicles on a network of main tracks. Non­
consumptive safaris involve the building of luxury lodges and hotels, 
extensive vehicle use and congestion in parks, greater numbers of 
tourists and more capital outlay. Photographic tourism involves more 
vehicles, more tourists, more consumption and more waste in order to  
generate the similar amounts of revenue. Furthermore, this kind of 
tourism, involves more leakage because of the wide array of people 
involved resulting in less direct benefit to local communities. Most 
importantly, photographic tourism exhibits a greater tendency to  
become mass tourism as made evident by the Kenyan experience.
12 The protectionist movement is concerned about extinction of animal species such as 
elephant and rhino and animal rights activists are concerned about the abuse or unethical 
treatment of animals subjected to hunting and culling. Zimbabweans have argued 
convincingly that large populations of elephants need to be managed to prevent them from 
destroying the wildlife habitat. Hunting quotas provide one means through which such 
population management can take place. A problem for the hunting lobby is the pressure that 
the protectionists can bring to bear through international trade agreements such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The future of hunting as 
the best model of ecotourism in Africa is therefore threatened by these emotive elements in 
the green movement.
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Though there is no legally enforced hunting season (Taylor 1994) hunts 
usually take place during the dry season (May to November) and the area 
is left to recover during the raining season. In general, hunting clients 
have little direct contact with local people, and as a result the 
commoditization and mutual exploitation symptomatic of mass tourism 
are less evident. However, the direct economic returns to local people 
from trophy hunting can be high as evidenced by the community 
projects such as schools and clinics and the household dividends 
distributed under the CAMPFIRE programme.
The problem with CAMPFIRE experiments has not been in generating 
significant revenues but rather in distributing the revenue equitably, 
and involving active participation of local people in management, 
rather than encouraging sleeping partners and passive receipt of hand­
outs. Hunting revenue, especially that revenue generated by elephant 
hunting, is crucial for the success of consumptive ecotourism under 
CAMPFIRE. For example, in Nyaminyami District (Mashonaland West) 
Taylor estimated that 38 percent of the three year average hunting 
quota for 1989-1991 was related to elephants. For these years, 
Nyaminyami earned Z$1,273 ,503 . The figure has since more than 
tripled. Taylor indicated that although non-consumptive tourism based 
on game viewing, walking and photographic safaris only generated 6 
percent of the district's income in 1991, it was projected that non­
consumptive tourism would soon earn triple the amount that was 
earned by hunting (Taylor 1994, T24). Lease fees paid by photographic 
safari operators for communal sites under a competitive tender 
process involving interviews with applicants has increased the value of 
these .sites.13 If Zimbabwe gradually becomes , a mass tourism 
destination as evidenced in the tourist arrival statistics, it is iikely 
that more and more tourist facilities will be built on communal land.
TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NON-CONSUMPTIVE TOURISM UNDER CAMPFIRE
The socio-cuiturai impacts of large numbers of photographic, cultural, 
nature or adventure tourists are that much more evident than a couple 
of high paying safari hunting clients. Tourist impacts on the culture 
and social system of the hosts are generally either neutral or negative
13 Lease fees for Binga, Chipinge, Hururtgwe, Mwange, Mzarabani and Nyaminyami Districts 
for photographic safaris were non existent in 1.988. By 1993 Binga District was earning 
Z$53,452 and by 1995 Chipinge District earned Z$200,000. The trend towards added 
value of such sites is becoming increasingly clear:
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(Smith 1989 ). An added problem is that non-consumptive use of 
wildlife resource use under CAMPFIRE does run the long term risk of 
becoming caught up in the boom and bust cycle of mass tourism; 
whereas hunting does not because it is based on a specialised elitist 
market. Under CAMPFIRE increasing interest is being shown in building 
semi-permanent photographic lodges on a concessionary lease basis 
contracted between district councils and tourist operators. Nature, 
culture and adventure tourism takes place with labour, cultural 
resources and raw materials for construction of the lodge being 
provided by local communities.
Mahenye Lodge in Chipinge District is an example of this kind of model 
ecotourist experiment on communal land. Situated on an island at the 
junction of the Sabi and Rundi confluence, the lodge provides access to  
the Gonarezhou National Park. The main attraction in this part of the 
park is for bird photography and identification'in beautiful riverine 
woodland. Cultural tourism in the form of village tours does exist but 
on a very low level. The Mahenye Lodge is currently being extended 
from an 11 bed facility to a 40 bed facility and this growth in itself 
indicates that ecotourism cannot remain static and must continue 
growing in order to be economically viable. The current phase of a 
small ecotourist operation is reportedly running at a loss. Large hotel 
chains, such as the Zimbabwe Sun which runs Mahenye, are primarily 
concerned about increasing their segment of the wildlife market. 
Though such experiments may start with noble goals to conserve the 
environment and benefit people, the profit motive is an essential 
aspect. The lodge has however already provided some tangible benefits 
to local people:
* The lodge provides training and employment opportunities 
for local people in the tourist industry.
* it provides direct economic benefits through a lease 
agreement with the district council and the local wildlife 
committee. This revenue is used for community projects or 
for household dividends.
* It has been involved in local infrastructural improvements 
such as the extension of the electrification grid into 
Mahenye ward itself.
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Potential negative long term  impacts of the lodge 
may include:
*  A lack of a coherent mechanism to deal with large numbers 
of tourist visiting local villages. The construction of a 
craft village has been proposed to deal with this problem.
* Projected negative affects include: commoditization of 
culture, dependency on tourism and hand-outs, problems 
occurring from increased differentiation o f wealth within 
the community, squatter settlements, increased pollution 
and other environmental impacts on roads and the park. A 
potential threat is that tourism will abandon the area when 
problems arise (m ilitary activity in the area, health 
problems such as AIDS or malaria) leaving local people 
without a source of income that they have come to depend 
upon.
Short term losses reportedly being incurred by such lodges as Mahenye 
are off-set against the projected incomes from expanded operations on 
communal land. Small-scale, environmentally friendly, people oriented 
photographic ecotourism does not make enough money to interest large 
hotel chains. As in the Kenya examples, more and more economic 
pressure for expansion of these small ecotourist endeavours to larger 
mass tourism will become evident as our tourist population increases.
One could argue that CAMPFIRE is precisely what Kenyans were 
negotiating for in the seventies for the Amboseii and Maasai Mara 
County Council game reserves. CAMPFIRE has devolved rights of 
revenue generation from central government treasury to  district 
council level through the Wild Life Act (1 9 7 5 ) and its amendment 
(1982), but communities (which bear the costs of crop-raiding animals) 
do not as yet have a legal right to accrue revenue themselves. Usually 
what occurs is that a safari or tourist operator will contract a 
business deal through the district council for a concession lease of an 
area that has potential for hunting or photographic activities. Local 
people and local communities have representatives on the district 
council but in most cases of CAMPFIRE revenue generation there is a 
problem that communities are the sleeping partner in these 
transactions. The problem that the Kenyan park wardens tried to iron
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out with the Maasai elders in the fifties is the same problem that faces 
the CAMPFIRE programme in the nineties.
In the Zimbabwean context the following technical aspects have to  
occur to enable ecotourism to take place:
1) Negotiation has to take place between the rural district council 
(the local authority for natural resource management on 
communal lands who co-operates with other government 
ministries), local people whose land is being used and 
representatives from the tourist and safari industry in order to  
create jo in t-ven ture  agreem ents (Hasler 1 9 9 4 ) . Non­
governmental organisations may facilitate this negotiation (e.g., 
World Wide Fund For Nature, ZimTrust or Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences - University of Zimbabwe). Precedents have been 
set under CAMPFIRE through which tenders for concession areas 
are advertised and local communities are involved in assessments 
and agreements of these tenders. The initiative may come from 
the tourist industry, local people or from the rural district 
council. Effective institutional mechanisms for participation of 
local people through wildlife management committees at local 
and district levels or the establishment of natural resource co­
operatives is a orereouisite for these negotiations.
Problem s:
a) The rural district council at Pest represents the interests 
of the entire district, not simply the areas where the 
tourist activities are to take place. Therefore, it is likely 
that local people may become sleeping partners in the 
tourist development. The loss of natural resources to  
tourism is a cost which may not be repaid adequately by the 
purported benefits.
b) Leakage of revenue from tourism occurs at many levels, 
because of the many different parties involved in producing 
the product. A solution to this problem may partly lie in 
extended consultation and participation of local people in 
planning the proposed tourism development. Contractual 
agreements which specify the nature and mechanisms of 
benefits will also help.
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2) Contractual agreements between the tourist industry, local 
government and local communities need to specify what are the 
benefits and costs of the tourism: local employment, 
infrastructural improvement, lease fees, percentage of gross or 
net profits, long term ownership of the initiative, training, 
mechanism through which revenue and benefits are to reach the 
local level all need to be spelt out ie. revenue will be channelled 
through district council* decisions on it will be made by local 
wildlife committees. Leakage and loopholes in this need to be 
identified. For instance, in the Zimbabwean context the law. 
needs to be changed to give legal rights over wildlife to local 
communities.
3) Consultation and contractual agreements on mechanisms for 
revenue sharing with local communities must be part of the 
overall agreement. Analysis of who benefits and who will pay the 
costs needs to be presented as part of the agreement.
4) Tourist development must take place away from the usual 
residential areas because the social and cultural costs of having 
it in the community itself are too great. Cultural tourism 
reduces cultural exchanges to economic transactions which 
effectively commoditizes culture. The Kenyan experience makes 
this very clear.
5) Further expansion of agreed tourist facilities in a trend towards 
mass tourism must be curtailed. This should be enforced through 
regulations, bye-laws and through the establishment of exclusive 
contracts.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECOTOURISM DILEMMA
In 1992 South Africa attracted 2.7 million visitors. 2.1 of these 
arrived from Africa, mainly for business or shopping. 560,000 arrived 
from abroad mainly from Europe. In 1993, 3 million arrived of which 
2.4 million were from Africa and 618,500 were from overseas (Satour 
1993, 27). Kerzner estimates that within three to four years of the 
elections South Africa will attract an additional million high , paying 
tourists per year each spending ten to twelve days in hotels (The
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Western Cape, 1 9 9 4 /9 5 ). South Africa is poising itself for a massive 
increase in tourist arrivals.
The recent political changes in South Africa have highlighted both the 
environmental concerns about sustainable use of resources and the 
political concerns about equitable use of resources by historically 
disadvantaged groups. The two issues are not exactly the same, and 
projects need to critically evaluate whether they are fusing the two. 
Ecotourism is presented as a panacea which seems to solve the problem 
by providing the engine for rural reconstruction (see Koch V994). 
"Community based" approaches to south Africa's environmental and 
equity problems tend to proceed as if the historical, economic and 
political processes which removed people from land, marginalized 
education and reduced rights of access to resources had never existed 
ie. as if disadvantaged communities were indeed magically empowered. 
Experience with CAMPFIRE has made it clear that "communities" do not 
exist in a political and economic vacuum. "Communities" are in a sense 
manifestations of the political and economic structures within which 
they have their being. The need for policy and legal review, 
identification of institutional mechanism to facilitate management of 
local resources (such as the development of local development 
organisations or local government) may be more important than ad 
vocative participatory approaches at this point in South African 
history, because existing structures of government and existing 
legislation still exist (much of which was designed during the  
apartheid era) which has historically marginalized such disadvantaged 
communities.
A key question in the New South Africa is how does one define the 
community that will benefit from tourism? Disadvantaged  
communities are part of broader processes of reform that are taking 
place at national, regional and local level (e.g., through trade unions, 
political parties, local government, etc.). The political economy of 
tourism is not based in these disadvantaged "communities" because it 
centres on international and national capital and therefore it really is a 
misnomer to talk about community based tourism. What communities 
can do is respond to market trends. This response in itself indicates 
that "communities" are not discrete bounded and homogeneous entities. 
They are fluid and responsive to the hierarchies of government, 
economics and politics.
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COMMUNITY-BASED TOURISM PRECEDENTS
An obvious place to start in unravelling this process is to look at the 
historical precedents that have been set for community based tourism 
in South Africa. The historical pattern of tourism in homelands and 
peripheral areas has been for large capital intensive developments, 
particularly casino hotels involving deals between previous homeland 
governmental or political structures and big capital. Often the big 
attraction was the lack of laws controlling gambling, Interracial sex 
and other forbidden fruits such as pornographic films (Lea 1988). The 
Royal Swazi Spar was one of the first of these closely followed by the 
Holiday Inn complex in Maseru. A series of other complexes followed on 
the borders of the Ciskei, Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Kwazulu. 
This form of tourism was often characterised by ostentatious wealth 
in a sea of poverty and there were very high social costs incurred. Lea 
estimated that at least three quarters of the slot-machine clientele 
were local people whose low incomes could not afford to  engage in such 
pursuits without forfeiting basic food, clothing and education.
PILANSBURG NATIONAL PARK (Sun City, Lost C ity)
A current example of massive investment in a previous homeland is the 
Lost City complex, which is a US$240 million investment that borders 
the Pilansburg Game Reserve in Boputhatswana. A three hundred and 
fifty bed hotel built along ethnic lines includes, a casino,, recreation 
centre imitation ocean and beach and an artificial rain forest including 
1.6 million plants. Two other luxury hotels surround! this: park: the Sun 
City and Marula, Lodge. According to Koch, the Pilansburg National: Park 
is regarded as one of the most successful, ecotourism experiments in 
South Africa and is seen as tackling the twin criteria of ecotourism: 
benefiting people and conserving the environment (1994 , 11).
Ironically, the establishment of the park in 1979 involved, and was 
followed by, much dispute about:
* the expropriation of grazing land of local communities; 
impounding of cattle entering the Sun City complex;
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* unfair remuneration of Sun City employees: and
* alleged exploitation of funds by the local authority. \
Koch refers to this episode as a "prime example of progressive rhetoric 
being used to describe what remained, in essence, a repressive form of 
economic development" (1 9 9 4 , 32 ). Under recent management, 
involving the setting up of community development organisations in the 
surrounding communities, more success in gaining local participation 
in benefits from the park has been achieved. The serious effort to build 
local institutions involved nominations from both local government 
(tribal authority) and an equal number of ordinary citizens. It is 
claimed that the negative view of the park by local people no longer 
exists. Yet Koch points out that after 10 years in existence the park 
still relies on funding for development and operational costs.
This massive investm ent potential indicates th a t ecotourist 
experiments in South Africa may be subjected to very powerful 
economic interests in the tourism industry, once they establish 
clientele and develop the potential of a destination, paving the way, for 
mass tourism. This is exacerbated by the fact that ecotourism is 
perceived as a means by which economic growth can be achieved. An 
essential issue in the South African economy is the creation of jobs. In 
this regard, it is hoped that tourism will become the number one 
industry in South Africa by ther year 2,000. and that it will kick start 
the economy for the rural reconstruction (Koch 1994, 12). This 
indicates that what South Africa is really heading towards is the boom 
and bust cycle of mass tourism with the omission of serious 
mechanisms for sharing of profits and benefits with local people. Here 
lies a major contradiction in the definition o f ecotourism, as high 
levels of economic growth, such as those needed to kick start the South 
African economy, will demand mass tourism at the long term expense 
of environmental conservation and social equity issues,.
MTHETHOMUSHA .
According to New Ground Magazine, the Mthethomusha reserve 
bordering the Kruger National park was first discussed in 1984, when 
negotiation took place between the KaNgwane Parks Corporation and 
local traditional leaders in regard to the establishment o f an
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ecotourism and conservation area in dry mountainous territory near the 
park (1 9 9 1 /9 2 , No.6, 16). Job creation (some two hundred jobs were 
created most of which were taken by people from nearby villages), and 
revenue generation from a luxury lodge goes to the tribal authority. 
The lodge is currently managed by a large hotel Chain. 60 percent of 
the income (it is not specified whether this is net income or gross 
income) goes to the tribal authority, who have formed- a trust company. 
Revenue has been spent mainly on classroom blocks and creches. New  
Ground Magazine indicates that there has been some discussion about 
broadening participation in this project as the tribal authority Is not 
representative of the elected civic and democratic organisations in the 
villages surrounding the reserve.
This project raises the same questions that the Kenyan and CAMPFIRE 
material raises:
* What is the long term prospect for such tourism?
* With a large hotel chain involved in producing the product* 
the market will determine the nature and development off 
this tourism option. Will it inexorably become mass 
tourism?
* Will revenue sharing create low profit margins which will 
put such schemes out of business before local people have 
been sufficiently trained to manage and run the lodge 
themselves?
* Can such contingency issues be planned for at the local 
level?
The track record from Kenya and Zimbabwe indicates th a t  
"communities" respond passively to the market. Internal differentiation 
of perspectives at community level hampers cohesive management 
plans, while differentiation of political and economic forces on 
tourism markets and their management at district, national and 
international levels d irectly  a ffe c t local outcom es w ithin  
communities. The issue of accountability of local authorities, (are 
they accountable to central government or to their constituents?) also 
raises the question in the New South Africa of whether such schemes
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are appropriately designed only for the benefit of "local" people, 
especially when they are a buffer on national resources such as a 
national park.
Experience with CAMPFIRE indicates that naive definitions of local 
communities as homogeneous, self contained, and as existing outside of 
the existing political and economic currents which largely determine 
the success of projects can seriously flaw such initiatives from the 
start. A series of economic and political levels are in fact articulated 
through such schemes and not involving appropriate political levels in 
the protocols of designing such schemes can back-fire. Usually these 
entities will include local government, local community as defined 
through development or conservation associations or committees, 
private sector and non governmental organisations. Having said this, 
the biggest problem that the CAMPFIRE programme has had is in 
identifying "communities"14 and working towards the attainment of 
legal rights of access for local resources by local people given the 
existing legislation.
OTHER ECOTOURISM EXAMPLES
The Richtersveldt experiment is essentially a "contract park" in the 
north Western Cape (Koch 1994, 32). The park is important from a 
biodiversity perspective, and has 1,000 species of succulents. In the 
late 1980's, a dispute arose between the indigenous inhabitants of the 
area, and the South African National Parks Board over the latter's 
intention to proclaim a nature reserve and to remove pastoral people 
living there. The local people refused to move and were supported by 
human rights groups and academics from Cape Town. The local people
14 In the Zimbabwean political economy, the "community" can be thought of as an onion, 
with layer after layer of community identity peeling away to reveal further community 
identity. . For example, the political order can be seen in terms of levels: international, 
national, provincial, district, ward, village, households.. This segmentary definition of 
community is possible because so many issues impinging on local outcomes are defined at 
higher levels. For example, CITES debates largely determine whether elephants will be 
traded directly influencing revenue to. local people. National politics and policy influence 
who has access to resources,- district interests may see these resources as belonging to them, 
while ward, village and household may regard the same resources as falling under their 
jurisdiction. A compromise between these different levels of access rights and a mixture of 
interests including the state, local communities and the private sector is what has become 
known as co-management.
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negotiated a right to remain in the area, continue grazing their 
livestock and also successfully negotiated for levenue and jobs from 
the park. A management committee was established to deal with these 
and other questions. Similarly in Maputaland resource sharing takes 
place with conservation agencies allowing local people access to  
identified resources such as reeds or fish, and tribal authorities 
received 25 percent of all revenue accruing from gate takings for 
social upliftment projects. "Kosi bay and Tomb areas have received 
negative publicity because of a significant gap at least in the past 
between their rhetoric and practice" of ecotourism (Koch 1994, 24). In 
general, the mechanisms by which benefits reach local communities, 
and deciding who in these communities are going to benefit is not 
sufficiently understood, thus in Maputaland the setting up of 
comm unity based game reserves, resulted in secessionist 
organisations. A crucial role is played by private sector investment in 
developing the lodges and tourist camps, but the danger, as in the 
CAMPFIRE program, is that the partnership between local authority, 
private sector and local community involves at least one if not two 
sleeping partners.
South Africa's private reserves are setting many of the trends in 
ecotourism. The Conservation Corporation runs the Londolozi Lodge in 
the Eastern Transvaal and the Phinda Lodge in Maputaland. The 
Corporation has an active policy of providing economic opportunities, 
skills, financial support and high paying jobs to local neighbours. The 
Corporation has set up a rural investment fund to engage in 
infrastructural projects in the poor areas neighbouring their reserves. 
Koch's account sites roads, a water reticulation project, entertainment 
centres, an airport for Gazankulu homeland, a donation of R100,000 for 
small business men in the area surrounding Phinda, and also the 
subsidising of schools and clinics... all this in the attem pt to attain 
legitimacy for a luxury ecotourist industry (Koch 1994, 35).
This indicates again that ecotourism in South Africa is often "Big 
Business" and "Big Promises". The temptation for the ecotourism 
industry is to portray itself as a panacea for all the problems of 
development that have accrued through history and as a result some of 
its claims become quite far fetched. It certainly is not possible for the 
ecotourist industry to become the economic engine for widespread 
development without becoming a mass tourism industry.
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A key problem is the appropriate institutional mechanism for 
community representation, accountability and effectiveness. This 
problem also exists in Kenya and in the CAMPFIRE program. Traditional 
leaders, democratically elected leaders, labour leaders, charismatic 
leaders, church leaders, special interest group or occupation leaders, 
government appointees, political party leaders, higher levels of 
government etc all need to be consulted. Civic organisations, tribal 
authorities, municipal and d istrict\county authorities, regional 
authorities all have some interest in ecotourism projects in their areas 
especially if it involves communal land or common property resources.
At the time of writing, South Africa's local government elections have 
not yet taken place. The nature, role and functions which local 
government in the New South Africa will play, and the various 
manifestations of this under the diverse local conditions obviously will 
affect ecotourism. As we have seen the Kenyans have abandoned local 
government as means through which ecotourism revenue can be 
equitably distributed. Under CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe is channelling its 
revenue through district councils and this is generally proving to be 
effective but is facing a big problem of accountability for and 
distribution of revenue. South Africa needs to make policy and legal 
decisions about the role of local government in Community revenue 
generation projects. The most likely outcome is a community co­
management model for South Africa, involving local government, non­
governmental organisations, voluntary and civic associations and 
special interest groups such as Co-operatives and trusts.
An important long term opportunity exists for South Africa to avoid 
some of the pitfalls and problems that have been faced in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe in regard to the recentralisatsop of control over resources at 
district\regional level. It needs to limit the legal entrenchment of 
economic redistribution faculties through local government. Instead 
legal mechanisms by which local people can manage revenues accruing 
from the management of their natural resources should be identified 
under the umbrella of local government.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
This itself is potentially full of conflict in the short term as events in 
South Africa bear testimony. For example, the Phola Park shanty- 
settlement near Johannesburg was apparently a model of participatory
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planning and development, a democratic development committee was 
established by an NGO to upgrade the informal housing settlement, but 
on the day the site and service scheme was to begin, the office of the 
development committee was attacked by men with guns and the scheme 
had to be shelved. The problem allegedly was that marginalized 
migrant workers, illegal residents and criminals benefited from the 
informal nature of the settlement. Another example is the Community 
trusts set up to deal with quotas from the fishing industry. Because 
people do not always regard these trusts as representative of their own 
interests, and because people want some immediate benefit to redress 
the historical injustices embedded in the fishing industry it has. added 
fuel to an already volatile situation. Ironically in this situation it may 
prove to be more appropriate for local government to manage these 
revenues on behalf of the local trusts until such time as the 
management capacity has increased and the squabbles have been ironed 
out. In South Africa, this indicates that a crucial criteria for the 
success of community based development including ecotourism, is that 
the undertaking of any such initiative does not initially aggravate 
unmanageable conflict. Conflict is -an inevitable parT of the 
development process and therefore mechanisms of conflict resolution 
have to evolve. These only emerge in a case, by case basis and therefore 
adaptive management is an important strategy that can be learnt from 
previous programs both in SA and elsewhere. Another important lesson 
from the Phola Park experience is that there must be both short term  
and long term  objectives, while the institutional capacity of 
communities is building.
CAMPFIRE has made it abundantly clear that "communities" are 
internally divided and differentiated. They are not homogeneous, and 
there are not necessarily one set of overriding interests. The challenge 
for South Africa is to try to identify resources and institutions which 
can build cohesion rather than provide a bone of contention. 
Institutions that can deal with dispute resolution at the local and 
higher levels are therefore crucial in the South African context. 1 
presume that the local government that emerges after October 1995 
will be working towards such a role, but this assumption may not be 
true for all areas or all cases. Experience from other countries also 
indicates that power tends to centralise so this may not be the full 
answer to South Africa's local level resource management questions.
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*  Mitigating environmental impacts of mass tourism phase by 
planning ahead.
*  Planning ahead for the potential collapse of the mass 
tourism industry once established.
" Successful',' tourism depends on growth and tourist needs, and 
perceptions continually change. Growth in tourism brings further 
impacts. This paper argues that planning ecotourism initiatives must 
have a long term view of where tourism leads, and a self-reflective 
weighing up of the negative impacts of competing land use strategies 
must be seen from both a long- term and short-term perspective.
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Figure 1: Evolutionary Catch 7.2 of a Successful Ecotourism Era,
(Successful ecotourism leads to mass tourism)
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Figure 2: Diagram indicating the links between various
components (production and distribution) of the tourism 
marketing mix. (From Kaufman, 1994)
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F i gu re  3 :  Rate of increase in number of beds at safari camps 
and lodges in the Gwayi Region. (Source: Jones in Jones and 
Hasler 1994, 25)
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Figure 4: Trends in regional and international visitor arrivals to 
Zimbabwe: 1980-1992. (Source: Jones in Jones and Hasler, 
1994)
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Y ear W orld A fr ic a K en y a
(in  m illio n s  o f  a rriv a ls) A rriv a ls C h a n g e E arn in gs 
K £  m il*
1980 2 8 4 .8 7.1 3 6 2 ,0 0 0 4 .1 4 82 .5
1981 2 8 8 .9 8 .0 3 5 2 ,0 0 0 -2 .84 9 0 .0
1982 2 8 6 .8 7.8 3 6 2 ,0 0 0 2 .7 6 118.0
1983 2 8 4 .2 8.2 3 3 3 ,0 0 0 -8.71 122.0
1984 312 .4 8 .9 4 5 3 .0 0 0 2 6 .4 9 152.0
1985 32 6 .5 9 .9 5 4 1 ,0 0 0 16 .27 2 0 9 .0
1986 3 3 4 .5 9 .5 6 0 4 ,0 0 0 10.43 25 0 .0
1987 3 6 1 .2 10.0 6 6 2 ,0 0 0 8 .7 6 2 9 2 .0
1988 3 9 3 .2 12.7 6 7 6 ,9 0 0 2 .2 0 3 4 9 .0
1989 4 0 5 .3 13.3 7 1 3 ,8 0 0 5 .4 5 4 3 2 .0
•K£sKSI'i2Q
le 1: International Tourist Arrivals in Kenya, 1980-1989
(Source: C.G. Gakahu and B. Goode, 1994, p75)
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% Occupancy
Y ear Arrivals Zimbabwe Vic Falls Hwange M ain Camp
1980 268418 . 43 - ' •
1981 372436 40 34
1982 331740 37 39
1983. 276864 33 25 31 24
1984 314383 34 30 32 42
1985 361646 38 40 33 47
1986 395091 37 33 34 54
1987 454779 36 34 33 45
1988 451844 41 40 34 49
1989 466161 45 50 44 71
1990 582602 47 55 . 51 40
1991 636676 50 57 55 52
1992 703279 46 57 49 63
1993 41 51 40 59
R a te  o f  
C h ange %
8.4% 0.5% 8.6% 3.1% 10.2%
Table Z: Tourism arrivals in Zimbabwe, hotel occupancy rates
in Zimbabwe, Victoria Falls and Hwange, and occupancy 
rates for National Parks accommodation at Main Camp. 
(Jones in Jones and Hasler 1994, 11)
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